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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ocean acidification will have profound effects on the entire 
human population and natural resources that depend in any 
way upon Earth’s oceans and lakes. In turn, those effects will 
be even greater, and potentially catastrophic, for indigenous 
populations who rely on the seas for physical, cultural, and 
spiritual sustenance. While most research on carbon dioxide 
absorption from the atmosphere has focused on oceans and the 
resulting acidification, many believe that acidification levels 
also will also increase in the Great Lakes.1 Indian tribes in the 
Pacific Northwest and the Great Lakes regions share reliance 
                                               
 Professor of Law and Director, Native American Law Center, University of 
Washington School of Law; Oneida Indian Nation Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard 
Law School (2009-2020). 
1. Brian Bienkowski, Acidification is not just for oceans—the Great Lakes could 
acidify, too, as our carbon emissions increase. Here’s why you should take note. THE 
DAILY CLIMATE (December 8, 2015), http://www.dailyclimate.org/tdc-newsroom/2015/
12/forgetting-freshwater-could-the-great-lakes-be. NOAA OCEAN ACIDIFICATION 
STEERING COMM., NOAA OCEAN AND GREAT LAKES ACIDIFICATION RESEARCH PLAN: 
SPECIAL REPORT 107 (2010), http://www.nodc.noaa.gov/media/pdf/oceanacidification/
NOAA_OA_Steering2010.pdf (last visited April 24, 2016). 
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on marine and freshwater resources, and many treaties 
contain provisions reserving off-reservation access to these 
resources.2 These treaties have consistently been interpreted 
as the Indians would have understood them, with any 
ambiguities interpreted in favor of the tribes.3 While many 
tribes have fought off incursions on their territories and treaty 
rights in particular cases, the threats from greenhouse gases 
and ocean acidification call for even greater efforts due to 
extensive tribal rights in affected waters and resources.4 This 
battle also requires a major effort on the part of the United 
States government. 
Each article in this book details the problem of ocean 
acidification, which as Professor Hull describes, is also known 
as climate change’s “evil twin.”5 Professor Mary Wood describe 
the Atmospheric Trust Litigation effort to force “urgent 
emission reductions around the world,”6 while Jaqueline M. 
Bertelsen draws specific attention to the federal government’s 
obligation to protect the Tulalip Tribes’ access to shellfish beds, 
and makes specific recommendations for federal and state 
actions to accomplish that end.7 Others offer a creative array of 
legal and policy arguments to deal with this escalating problem 
threatening the most important natural resource on the 
                                               
2. See Treaty with the Yakamas art. 3, 1855, 12 Stat. 951 (“The exclusive right of 
taking fish in all the streams, where running through or bordering said reservation, is 
further secured to said confederated tribes and bands of Indians, as also the right of 
taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common with the citizens of the 
Territory, and of erecting temporary buildings for curing them; together with the 
privilege of hunting, gathering roots and berries, and pasturing their horses and cattle 
upon open and unclaimed land.”); Treaty with the Lake Superior Chippewa, art. 11, 10 
Stat. 1109 (“And such of them as reside in the territory hereby ceded, shall have the 
right to hunt and fish therein, until otherwise ordered by the President.”). 
3. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); 
Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Fishing Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 
U.S. 658 (1979). 
4. See Fawn Sharp, Tribes have up close perspective on climate change, THE SEATTLE 
TIMES (April 23, 2016), http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/tribes-have-up-close-per
spective-on-climate-change/. 
5. Robin Kundis Craig, Dealing with Ocean Acidification: The Problem, The Clean 
Water Act, and State and Regional Approaches, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1583, 1585 (2015). 
6. Mary Christina Wood & Charles W. Woodward, IV, Atmospheric Trust Litigation 
and the Constitutional Right to a Healthy Climate System: Judicial Recognition at 
Last, 6 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 633 (2016). 
7. Jaqueline M. Bertelsen, “Fed” Up with Acidification: “Trusting” the Federal 
Government to Protect the Tulalip Tribes’ Access to Shellfish Beds, 6 WASH. J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 495 (2016). 
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planet.8 All of these approaches, if followed, may help a bad 
situation from getting worse. The United States must consider 
the effects of any action, or inaction, upon Indian treaty rights 
and resources. Federal law does not permit abrogation of 
Indian treaty rights absent express congressional 
authorization,9 and third-party interference with treaty rights 
is not permitted.10 Federal permitting processes that may 
adversely affect treaty resources must take place in 
consultation with the affected tribes, and be consistent with 
the federal government’s trust responsibility. 
This essay describes the nature of Indian treaty rights and 
the federal-tribal relationship, shows how the United States 
has sometimes acted to protect Indian treaty rights, and 
argues that the United States must do more to protect and 
enhance environmental conditions that are causing ocean 
acidification. Tribal property rights secured by treaty, and the 
federal government’s trust responsibility require serious 
protective action by the United States to stop the increase in 
ocean and freshwater acidification. Part II describes the 
federal-tribal relationship and the parameters of the federal 
trust responsibility. Part III reviews legal authority supporting 
federal litigation and administrative actions to protect Indian 
treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather and to the habitat upon 
which those rights depend. Part IV concludes the piece with a 
normative discussion of why the federal trust responsibility 
requires the robust use of protective, proactive, and 
ameliorative efforts outlined by others in this book. In sum, it 
will take a broader view of the trust responsibility and more 
aggressive action by policy makers to force limitations on 
greenhouse gas emissions and stem the harm from increasing 
ocean acidification. 
II. THE FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY 
A. Background 
The United States’ trust responsibility has its roots in 
international law and treaties and agreements made between 
                                               
8. See Ryan P. Kelly & Margaret R. Caldwell, Ten Ways States Can Combat Ocean 
Acidification(And Why They Should), 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 57 (2013). 
9. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986). 
10. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). 
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the United States and indigenous Nations.11 European nations 
that explored and came to what is now the United States, 
asserted exclusive rights to deal with the Indigenous Nations 
in matters related to land and intergovernmental relations. 
This assertion of authority was largely designed to resolve 
competition between the European Nations and could not 
affect the status of Indian nations as pre-existing sovereigns. 
When the United States Constitution was adopted, the federal 
government assumed exclusive authority in all matters related 
to Indian affairs, and got to work on the colonization process. 
Nearly fifty years later, Supreme Court Chief Justice John 
Marshall stated that the “Indian nations had always been 
considered as distinct, independent political communities, 
retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed 
possessors of the soil, from time immemorial.”12 The Supreme 
Court in 2004 noted that “at least during the first century of 
America’s national existence . . . Indian affairs were more an 
aspect of military and foreign policy than a subject of domestic 
or municipal law.”13 A look back in time reveals that Indian 
nations and the United States government have a sovereign-to-
sovereign relationship evidenced by the Constitution,14 
treaties,15 agreements,16 acts of Congress,17 and court 
decisions.18 The federal trust responsibility is derived from all 
these sources, as well as their international law antecedents. 
While the earliest treaties reflected a desire for mutual 
peace and intergovernmental respect, as a practical matter the 
tribes were made subject to various federal laws without 
regard to tribal desires.19 This colonial treatment of indigenous 
                                               
11. See generally NELL J. NEWTON & ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §§ 5.04, 5.05 (Newton et al., 2012 ed. 2012). 
12. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 558 (1832). 
13. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004). 
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
15. See, e.g., Treaty with the Yakamas, and Treaty with the Lake Superior 
Chippewa, supra note 2. 
16. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1906) (discussing agreement ratified 
by Congress). CHARLES WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW (1986) 
(discussing treaty substitutes utilized after 1871). 
17. Act June 30, 1834, c. 161, § 12, 4 Stat. 730 (codified in part at 25 U.S.C. § 177) 
(restricting sale of Indian land without federal approval); American Indian Trust Fund 
Management Reform Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4061. 
18. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296–97 (1942). 
19. See Robert T. Anderson, Treaty Substitutes in the Modern Era, ch. 11, in THE 
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peoples was geared toward the United States’ acquisition of 
land for westward expansion.20 In return, the United States 
provided compensation in various forms. Most important from 
the Indian perspective were the promises of permanent 
homelands, access to natural resources, and recognition of the 
right to continue to exist as distinct sovereign peoples. The 
Supreme Court noted that although the federal government 
and others had colonized the United States, the law of nations 
mandated that the Indian tribes were owed a duty of 
protection from incursions on tribal governmental authority 
and independence within the newly formed nation.21 These 
rights were to be safeguarded, and supported, by the United 
States, especially from interference by the states. The 
government-to-government relationship and these promises of 
political allegiance remain at the foundation of the federal 
trust responsibility despite vacillating federal policies. The 
initial respect for tribal territories was eroded with the 
President Andrew Jackson’s removal policy, which was effected 
by a number of actions—the most infamous of which is the 
Trail of Tears.22 allotment of tribal lands, and the associated 
loss of approximately ninety million acres of tribal land by 
1934.23 Congress returned to the public domain lands that 
were considered “surplus” to Indian needs.24 While previous 
reservations were generally under exclusive tribal ownership, 
the new allotment policies allowed an influx of non-Indians 
within reservation boundaries. This resulted in a checkerboard 
pattern of land ownership within reservations and introduced 
many of today’s vexing jurisdictional problems.25 
                                               
POWER OF PROMISES, RETHINKING INDIAN TREATIES IN THE PACIFIC 
NORTHWEST, (Alexandra Harmon ed., 2008); see also CHARLES F. WILKINSON, 
MESSAGES FROM FRANKS’ LANDING: A STORY OF SALMON TREATIES, AND THE INDIAN 
WAY 11, 14 (2000). 
20. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 197–98 (1999) 
(describing treaty negotiations in Minnesota, and quoting “statement of Hole-in-the-
Day, the principal negotiator for the Chippewa: ‘Your words strike us in this way. They 
are very short. “I want to buy your land.” These words are very expressive—very curt.’
”). 
21. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
22. See ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND 
COMMENTARY 50–55, 74–77 (3d ed. 2015). 
23. See Judith K. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 10–12 (1995). 
24. See, e.g., Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984). 
25. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 
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Congress reversed course with the adoption of the Indian 
Reorganization Act (IRA) in 1934—sometimes known as the 
Indian “New Deal.”26 The IRA “halted further allotments and 
extended indefinitely the existing periods of trust applicable to 
already allotted Indian lands.”27 This return to support of 
tribal self-government and a secure Indian land base was 
short-lived, however, as less than twenty years later, Congress 
adopted a resolution calling for the “termination” of the 
federal-tribal relationship with certain Indian tribes.28 
Although the termination period quickly fell into disfavor, its 
short tenure resulted in the end of the government-to-
government relationship between the United States and over 
seventy federally recognized Indian tribes, and transferred 
jurisdiction over those tribes to the states.29 This state control 
turned the historic federal-tribal relationship on its head. 
States began aggressively to assert jurisdiction over Indian 
country through laws such as Public Law. 280, which gave 
selected states full criminal and some civil jurisdiction over 
Indian county—without regard to tribal desires.30 
Although federal policies changed over time from the 
reservation system, to removal, to allotment and assimilation 
era, and then to outright termination of the federal-tribal 
                                               
U.S. 408 (1989); Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 
(1962); Royster, supra note 23, at 1. 
26. Wheeler-Howard Act, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 461–79). 
27. 25 U.S.C. § 461 (On and after June 18, 1934, no land of any Indian reservation, 
created or set apart by treaty or agreement with the Indians, Act of Congress, 
Executive order, purchase, or otherwise, shall be allotted in severalty to any Indian.). 
See Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 
U.S. 251, 255 (1992). 
28. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. (1953) (directing the Secretary of the Interior to 
recommend tribes for termination). See NEWTON & ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 11, 
§ 1.06, at 95. In general, “[termination] would mean that Indian tribes would 
eventually lose any special standing they had under Federal law: the tax exempt 
status of their lands would be discontinued; Federal responsibility for their economic 
and social well-being would be repudiated; and the tribes themselves would be 
effectively dismantled.” Richard M. Nixon, Special Message to Congress on Indian 
Affairs (July 8, 1970), H.R. Doc. 91-363, at 1. But see Menominee Tribe v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (termination of Menominee Indian Tribe did not abrogate 
tribal rights to hunt and fish free of state regulation). 
29. See NEWTON & ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 11, § 1.06, at 95. 
30. See generally Robert T. Anderson, Negotiating Jurisdiction: Retroceding State 
Authority over Indian Country Granted by Public Law 280, 87 WASH. L. REV. 915 
(2012). 
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relationship, since 1970 the federal policy is one of Indian self-
determination without termination. This modern policy 
implements the federal government’s trust responsibility to 
protect and advance Indian Nations’ status as governments 
with inherent sovereignty. Indian reservations have come to be 
regarded permanent tribal homelands with President Nixon’s 
1970 address rejecting the forced termination policy described 
the nature of the federal-tribal relationship. 
The policy of forced termination is wrong in my 
judgment, for a number of reasons. First, the premises 
on which it rests are wrong. Termination implies that 
the Federal government has taken on a trusteeship for 
Indian communities as an act of generosity toward a 
disadvantaged people and that can therefore 
discontinue this responsibility on a unilateral basis 
whenever it sees fit. But the unique status of Indian 
tribes does not rest on any premise such as this. The 
special relationship between Indians and the federal 
government is the result of solemn obligations, which 
have been entered into by the United States 
Government. Down through the years, through written 
treaties and through formal and informal agreements, 
our government has made specific commitments to the 
Indian people. For their part, the Indians have often 
surrendered claims to vast tracts of land and have 
accepted life on government reservations. In exchange, 
the government has agreed to provide community 
services such as health, education and public safety, 
services that would presumably allow Indian 
communities to enjoy a standard of living comparable to 
that of other Americans.31 
The Supreme Court has concluded that the United States 
“has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest 
responsibility and trust.”32 Since then, the American Indian 
Policy Review Commission (AIPRC) was established by a 
resolution of Congress in 1973 to review all aspects of Indian 
law and policy, including the federal trust responsibility.33 The 
Final Report of the AIPRC carefully evaluated the trust 
                                               
31. Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, Special Message on Indian 
Affairs (July 8, 1970). 
32. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296–97 (1942). 
33. S.J. Res. 133, 93rd Cong. (1973). 
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responsibility and described it as “a rather confusing legal 
concept with murky origins and inexact application.”34 The 
Final Report noted that the National Tribal Chairman’s 
Association categorized the trust responsibility as including: 1) 
protection and proper management of Indian resources, 
properties and assets; 2) protections and support of tribal 
sovereignty; and 3) provision of community and social services 
to tribal members.35 This characterization is consistent with 
the AIPRC Final Report’s evaluation of the federal trust, and 
was relied upon by the Commission for a variety of 
recommendations for federal implementation of the trust 
responsibility in the modern era. These recommendations 
sparked a remarkable congressional response—one unheard of 
in any era of federal Indian policy. Over a dozen federal 
statutes were developed in consultation with Indian tribes 
intended to promote economic self-sufficiency, and to protect 
tribal natural resources and the distinct sovereign status of 
Indian nations and their people.36 
More recently, in 2009, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar 
appointed a five member Commission on Indian Trust 
Administration and Reform to carry out a comprehensive 
review of the Interior Department’s performance in carrying 
                                               
34. AM. INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM’N, FINAL REPORT SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS 
MAY 17, 1977, at 125 (1977). 
35. AM. INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM’N, REPORT ON TRUST RESPONSIBILITIES AND 
THE FEDERAL-INDIAN RELATIONSHIP 47 (1976). 
36. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act (ISDEA) of 
1975, 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq. (amended by the Tribal Self-Governance Acts of 1988, 
1994, and 2000, 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aa to 458aaa-18); Tribally Controlled Schools Act of 
1988, 25 U.S.C. § 2501 et seq.; Tribally Controlled Colleges and Universities Act of 
1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.; Native American Housing Assistance Self-
Determination Act of 1996, 25 U.S.C. § 4101 et seq.; Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 
U.S.C. § 1415 et seq.; Indian Forest Resources Management Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3101–
3120; Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2108; Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721; Tribal Treatment as State under the 
Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, 42 U.S.C. § 7474(c) (Clean Air Act), 33 U.S.C. § 
1377(e) (Clean Water Act); Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1931; 
American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996; Native American 
Languages Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2906; Native American Grave Protection 
and Repatriation Act of 1990 (NAGPRA), 18 U.S.C. § 1170, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013; 
Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. Law 111-211, 111th Cong. 2d Sess., 124 Stat. 
2258, 2261–2301; Helping Expedite and Advance Responsible Tribal Home Ownership 
Act of 2012, amending 25 U.S.C. § 415; Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act, 
Pub. L. 113-4, Title IX, § 904, 127 Stat. 120 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304). 
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out federal trust responsibilities.37 The Commission’s Report 
noted that, “in the past, the trust responsibility was viewed as 
a demeaning and paternalistic guardian-ward relationship. 
That model is unsuited for the modern self-determination era, 
but . . . the outmoded trust model still influences the 
performance of the federal government’s obligations to Indian 
nations and people in some cases.”38 The Commission 
concluded: 
It is critical that the United States continue to 
acknowledge its historic legal and moral obligations to 
Indian nations to further the sovereign-to-sovereign 
relationship at the foundation of the many complex 
dealings that occur on a regular basis. It must be 
remembered that the United States would not exist but 
for the acquisition of tribal territories that were given 
in exchange for the continued support and respect of the 
federal government. The promises of permanent 
homelands and recognition of the right to continue to 
exist as distinct sovereign peoples impose solemn 
obligations on all branches of the federal government.39 
Unfortunately, the federal government does not always live 
up to the Commission’s proposed standard. This is because the 
United States vigorously defends itself when Indian tribes 
bring suit against seeking monetary compensation for harm 
allegedly caused by federal agencies to tribal financial or 
natural resources. In so doing, the United States sometimes 
avoids monetary liability in tribal breach of trust actions. The 
Supreme Court has opined that the federal trust responsibility 
is sometimes different than a private trust, and that common 
law trust duties do not apply to the United States under all 
circumstances. This has created a mistaken impression that 
the federal government is relieved of obligations to protect 
treaty resources from third party harm. As set out in the next 
section, the line of cases limiting federal liability has no 
                                               
37. Order 3292 (Dep’t of the Interior, December 8, 2009). The author of this chapter 
was a member of the Commission and co-author of the Report. 
38. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INDIAN TRUST 
ADMINISTRATION AND REFORM, FINAL REPORT, APPROVED BY THE COMMISSION (2013), 
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/cobell/commission/upload/Report-of-
the-Commission-on-Indian-Trust-Administration-and-Reform_FINAL_Approved-12-
10-2013.pdf. 
39. Id. at 33. 
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application to consideration of prospective actions to protect 
treaty resources—a topic considered in Part III. 
B. Federal Trust Liability Standards 
Private trusts are different from the complex federal-tribal 
relationship in a number of ways. A leading legal treatise 
describes a trust “as a fiduciary relationship in which one 
person holds a property interest, subject to an equitable 
obligation to keep or use that interest for the benefit of 
another.”40 The basic elements of a private trust include: 1) 
trust property held for the benefit of another; 2) a settlor who 
creates the trust; 3) a trustee who holds the property for 
another; 4) a beneficiary for whom the property is managed; 
and 5) a trust instrument which defines the purpose of the 
trust and duties of the trustee and rights of the beneficiary.41 
The trustee is a fiduciary from which the law demands an 
unusually high standard of ethical or moral conduct with 
reference to the beneficiary. Trustees owe a duty to act solely 
in the interest of the beneficiary, and must not consider their 
own personal advantage.42 
While the property holding aspects of a private trustee are 
analogous in some ways to the federal-tribal trusteeship, the 
elements of a private trust cannot support the full realm of 
responsibilities embodied in federal trusteeship to Indian 
peoples. Private trust principles, however, provide appropriate 
guidance when the federal government is exercising 
management responsibilities for real property, and natural 
resources that it holds in trust for Indian tribes.43 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted 
the federal trust responsibility when it evaluates federal 
monetary liability for the breach of trust obligations.44 In the 
case of United States v. Navajo Nation,45 the Court considered 
claims that the Secretary of the Interior and the Bureau of 
                                               
40. George G. Bogert & Amy M. Hess, Trusts and Trustees, ch. 1, § 1 (3d ed. 2007). 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 475 (2003) 
(fundamental common law duty of trustee is to preserve and maintain trust assets). 
44. The Indian Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (waives federal sovereign immunity for 
money damages claims against the United States). 
45. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003). 
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Indian Affairs (BIA) failed to act in the Navajo’s best interest 
in the renewal of an expired coal lease between the Navajo and 
the Peabody Coal Company. The newly negotiated lease called 
for a twenty percent royalty, but could become effective only 
with the approval of the BIA. The Secretary privately met with 
a Peabody Coal Company representative and agreed to direct 
the BIA to delay lease approval.46 Laboring under the 
erroneous belief that the BIA (as opposed to the Secretary) was 
not inclined to approve the lease with a twenty percent royalty, 
the tribe agreed to a twelve percent royalty. The Court refused 
to award damages to the Navajo Nation to despite the 
unfaithful actions that resulted in a financial disadvantage to 
the Navajo Nation, in the form of an 8% reduction in the 
negotiated royalty.47 The Court reasoned that “there is no 
textual basis for concluding that the Secretary’s approval 
function includes a duty, enforceable in an action for money 
damages, to ensure a higher rate of return for the Tribe 
concerned.”48 In a second decision after the tribe prevailed on 
remand, the Court again rejected the Navajo Nation’s claims, 
and explained the test for determining when the United States 
is liable for damages in breach of trust cases. 
[T]here are thus two hurdles that must be cleared 
before a tribe can invoke jurisdiction under the Indian 
Tucker Act. First, the tribe must identify a substantive 
source of law that establishes specific fiduciary or other 
duties, and allege that the Government has failed 
faithfully to perform those duties. If that threshold is 
passed, the court must then determine whether the 
relevant source of substantive law can fairly be 
interpreted as mandating compensation for damages 
sustained as a result of a breach of the duties [the 
governing law] impose[s]. At the second stage, 
principles of trust law might be relevant in drawing the 
inference that Congress intended damages to remedy a 
breach.49 
                                               
46. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 497. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 511. 
49. United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 290–91 (2009). See also Fletcher v. 
United States, 730 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2013) (“So when Congress says the 
government may be called to account, we have some reason to think it means to allow 
the relevant Native American beneficiaries to sue for an accounting, just as traditional 
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The federal government has sometimes rested on this 
narrow standard to refuse to protect tribal resources from 
prospective harm, and to resist tribal efforts to compel agency 
action.50 As one respected commentator noted, “The trust 
responsibility should play a role in protecting tribal lands and 
resources, but the trust doctrine stands in potential jeopardy 
today as courts collapse protective trust requirements into 
statutory standards.”51 Professor Wood’s observation regarding 
the protective trust standards relates only to the question of 
federal court actions seeking to force the federal government to 
take protective actions. Whether or not courts are willing to 
force the United States to bring such protective actions is an 
important question, but the larger point is that the federal 
government’s good faith obligations should lead it to take 
protective actions involving tribal resources even if not 
compelled by the courts. As stated in the Northwest Ordinance 
of 1787: “the utmost good faith shall always be observed 
towards Indians; their land and property shall never be taken 
from them without their consent.”52 The federal government 
has in fact brought many actions to protect Indian treaty 
rights—both to harvest resources and to preserve habitat. 
Federal agencies have also stepped up in recent times to 
protect Indian treaty rights and associated habitat. As 
discussed in the concluding section III, these sorts of actions 
will be especially important in combatting climate change and 
associated acidification of the Ocean and freshwater lakes. 
III. PROTECTING INDIAN TREATY RIGHTS 
Indian treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather are property 
                                               
trust beneficiaries are permitted to do.”); NEWTON & ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 11, 
at 428 (“Private trust law principles are most often invoked in controversies involving 
direct management of tribal resources and funds.”). 
50. See, e.g., Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States, 469 F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 2006) (no 
judicially enforceable general duty to manage non-tribal resources so as not to harm 
tribal resources). See also NEWTON & ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 11, § 5.05[3][c], at 
431 (“In the absence of specific statutory duties, federal agencies discharge their trust 
responsibility if they comply with the statutes and general regulations.”).  
51. Mary C. Wood, The Federal Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal Lands and 
Resources Through Claims of Injunctive Relief against Federal Agencies, 39 TULSA L. 
REV. 355, 356 (2003). 
52. 32 J. Cont’l Cong. 340–41 (1787). 
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rights protected under federal law.53 Off-reservation hunting, 
fishing, and gathering rights are servitudes over the burdened 
lands. In a number of cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
interpreted treaties to contain the implied rights necessary to 
exercise a treaty’s explicit or substantive provisions. For 
example, in United States v. Winans,54 the Court confirmed 
that tribal members possess an easement of access over 
privately held land as necessary to the exercise of treaty 
hunting, fishing, and gathering rights. The Court specifically 
held that an access easement was necessarily implied from the 
treaties’ specific reservation of fishing rights at a usual and 
accustomed station. This principle ensures that reserved treaty 
rights are not rendered a nullity by shifting patterns of 
property ownership and development.55  
Similarly, in Winters v. United States, the Supreme Court 
held that when the federal government set aside land for the 
Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana, it impliedly 
reserved sufficient water from the Milk River to fulfill its 
purpose for creating the reservation, which was to provide a 
permanent tribal homeland with an agricultural economy.56 
Since Winters, courts addressing tribal reserved water rights 
for fisheries have recognized habitat protection as the basis for 
Indian reserved water rights.57 In the Adair and Walton I 
decisions, the courts recognized the obvious fact that the 
reserved treaty rights to fish on rivers and gather aquatic 
plants require the presence of sufficient water to maintain the 
rivers, lakes, and marshes upon which the plants and fisheries 
                                               
53. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 
U.S. 658 (1979); Menominee Indian Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968). See 
slso NEWTON & ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 11, § 18.02, p. 1156. 
54. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381–382 (1905). 
55. Id. 
56. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908). For a comprehensive review 
of the Indian reserved rights doctrine, see NEWTON & ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 11, § 
19.03. 
57. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414–1415 (9th Cir. 1983) (“confirm[ing] 
to the Tribe the amount of water necessary to support its hunting and fishing rights”); 
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton (Walton I), 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(awarding amount of water “necessary to maintain” on-reservation fishery). See Robert 
T. Anderson, Water Rights, Water Quality, and Regulatory Jurisdiction in Indian 
Country, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 195, 205–14 (2015) (summarizing the law of Indian 
reserved rights); NEWTON & ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 11. 
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depend.58 These Indian reserved rights are property rights 
with a priority dage of time immemorial,59 and thus are 
superior in rank to any water rights crated under other state 
or federal law. Federal and state agencies as well as private 
parties may not interefere with these in situ water rights. 
Moreover, the federal trust responsibility requires that the 
United States protect these rights.60  
Neither states, nor private property owners may bar tribal 
access to areas subject to treaty hunting, fishing, and 
gathering rights.61 This principle also applies to federal 
agencies.62 The United States’ trust responsibility extends not 
just to the Department of the Interior, but to the federal 
government as a whole. This responsibility includes duties to 
protect tribal assets and property from damage by third 
parties.63 Thus, all federal agencies, including the Army Corps 
                                               
58. Id. See also In re Yakima River Drainage Basin, 296 P.3d 835, 840 (Wash. 2013) 
(en banc) (“[The] nation also has a right that dates from time immemorial to adequate 
water to sustain fish and other aquatic life in Ahtanum Creek [which extends 
beyond reservation lands].”); State Dep’t of Ecology v. Yakima Reservation Irrigation 
Dist, 850 P.2d 1306, 1317 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (“All of the parties to this litigation 
agree that the Yakima Indians are entitled to water for irrigation purposes and, at least 
at one time, were entitled to water for the preservation of fishing rights. The 
disagreement here is the extent of the treaty rights remaining.”). See, e.g., Joint Bd. 
of Control of Flathead Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 832 F.2d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 
1987) (reversing trial court’s refusal to issue injunction to protect tribal water rights 
for fish); Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 763 F.2d 1032 
(9th Cir. 1985) (holding district court acted appropriately in ordering release of water 
to protect habitat for the fishery); United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. 
Wash. 1982), aff’d in part,  rev’d in part, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing a 
reserved tribal water right for water needed to maintain favorable temperature 
conditions to support the fishery); State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & 
Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 712 P.2d 754, 764–66 (Mont. 1985) 
(recognizing that tribal reserved rights may include water for fisheries as well as 
agriculture and other purposes). 
59. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1413–15. See NEWTON & ANDERSON ET AL., supra, note 11. 
60. Criteria and Procedures for Indian Water Rights Settlements, 55 Fed. Reg. 9223 
(1990) (“Indian water rights are vested property rights for which the United States has 
a trust responsibility, with the United States holding legal title to such water in trust 
for the benefit of the Indians.”). 
61. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381, 384. 
62. Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F. 
Supp. 553 (D. Or. 1977) (Army Corps of Engineers may not construct dam that will 
destroy usual and accustomed fishing stations without express authorization by 
Congress). 
63. See Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539, 546–47 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[Commerce] 
Secretary Brown issued emergency regulations to conserve salmon runs and to ensure 
consistency with ‘any other applicable law,’ which includes the Tribes’ federally 
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of Engineers, Department of Commerce, and Coast Guard, 
shoulder the same consultation and trust responsibilities as 
the Department of the Interior.64 As one commentator notes, 
however, existence of the trust responsibility has not prevented 
massive damage to natural resources upon which tribes 
depend. “In recent decades, federal agencies have developed a 
myriad of “government to government” relationships with 
tribes and have created policies to carry out their trust 
obligation. Such policies, however, have generally failed to 
ensure protection of tribal interests.”65 As discussed below, 
however, the United States has in fact brought many cases 
before the courts to protect Indian treaty rights and has an 
improving record in agency decision-making that protects or 
accommodates Indian treaty rights. 
A number of federal courts have also ruled that protection of 
Indian treaty rights can preclude federal or state action that 
could adversely affect those rights by harming species’ habitat, 
or the places at which the tribes are entitled to exercise their 
rights.66 Like the implied rights recognized in United States v. 
                                               
reserved fishing rights.”). 
64. Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000). See also President 
Barack Obama, Tribal Consultation Memorandum for the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,879 (Nov. 5, 2009) (reiterating Exec. Order 
No. 13,175 and ordering all agency heads to report to OMB with detailed plans for 
compliance with Exec. Order No. 13,175); Executive Order Establishing the White 
House Counsel on Native American Affairs, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,539 (June 26, 2013) (“This 
order establishes a national policy to ensure that the Federal Government engages in a 
true and lasting government-to-government relationship with federally recognized 
tribes in a more coordinated and effective manner, including by better carrying out its 
trust responsibilities.”). 
65. Mary Christina Wood & Zachary Welcker, Tribes As Trustees Again (Part I): The 
Emerging Tribal Role in the Conservation Trust Movement, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
373, 387–88 (2008). Professor Wood provides a scathing review of the United States’ 
actions toward tribal interests. “The federal government has ignored its trust 
obligation time and time again and actively resists any judicial enforcement of the 
trust in pending court cases. Litigation to protect harvest resources has failed largely 
due to the deference courts give to agencies.” Id. at 393 (footnotes and citations 
omitted). 
66. See Umatilla v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553 (D. Or. 1977) (duty to protect fish 
and fishing rights reserved by treaties applies to federal agencies as well as state and 
local governments; Army Corps of Engineers may not destroy fishing grounds absent 
authorization by Congress); No Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334, 372–73 (W.D. 
Wash. 1981) (ordering hearing on whether sedimentation caused by proposed oil 
pipeline would adversely affect spawning habitat); United States v. Anderson, 736 
F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding the Tribe has a right of sufficient water quality and 
quantity to preserve fishing); Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation 
Dist., 763 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding district court’s finding that 
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Winans and Winters v. United States,67 in Muckleshoot Indian 
Tribe v. Hall, a federal district court enjoined construction of a 
marina in Elliott Bay that would eliminate a portion of the 
tribe’s usual and accustomed fishing site.68 The court rejected 
arguments by the Corps of Engineers, along with public and 
private developers, that there would be a de minimis effect on 
tribal treaty rights. 
No case has been presented to this Court holding that it 
is permissible to take a small portion of a tribal usual 
and accustomed fishing ground, as opposed to a large 
portion, without an act of Congress, or to permit 
limitation of access to a tribal fishing place for a 
purpose other than conservation. In Umatilla, the court 
refused to permit an unauthorized taking of some, not 
all, of the fishing stations which would be flooded by the 
proposed dam’s two and one-half mile reservoir on 
Catherine Creek. 440 F. Supp. at 555. In Oregon, the 
States’ proposed restriction of treaty fishing would have 
eliminated two pools in the upper half of the Columbia 
River zone at issue, and left the tribes access to a 21.6–
mile pool and one hatchery. 718 F.2d at 301–02. In 
Winans, one fishing station on the Columbia River was 
at issue. 198 U.S. at 371. In each of these cases, the 
court did not allow the tribes’ right of access to their 
usual and accustomed fishing places to be impaired, 
limited or eliminated and did not indicate that the 
extent or amount of damage to the property right was a 
factor to weigh in reaching its decision.69 
The Army Corps took the court’s admonitions seriously, and 
in N.W. Sea Farms, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,70 the 
district court upheld the denial of a federal permit to construct 
net pens for a fish farm at a Lummi Nation usual and 
                                               
Bureau of Reclamation had authority to release water from project to protect treaty 
fish habitat from dewatering). See also Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. 
Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D. D.C. 1972 and 1973) (holding the Secretary of Interior is 
required to provide all water possible to Pyramid Lake to preserve fish depended upon 
by the Tribe, after fulfilling requirement of earlier decrees and contracts). 
67. See supra notes 56 & 57 and accompanying text. 
68. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Hall, 698 F. Supp. 1504, 1515–16 (W.D. Wash. 
1988). 
69. Id. at 1515. 
70. N.W. Sea Farms v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 931 F. Supp. 1515, 1521–22 (W.D. 
Wash. 1996). 
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accustomed fishing place. The court found that it is the Corps’ 
fiduciary duty to the Lummi Nation, rather than any express 
regulatory provision, which mandates that the Corps consider 
and protect the Tribe’s treaty-secured right to take fish at its 
usual and accustomed places. At the same time, if a permitted 
action will have only a de minimis effect on the exercise of 
treaty rights or habitat, courts may deny relief.71 
In a recent decision, the Army Corps of Engineers discussed 
the de minimis standard when it denied a permit application 
for a port facility (Cherry Point) near Bellingham, Washington, 
which would receive and ship coal to Asian markets from the 
Powder River Basin in Wyoming and Montana. 
At full build out, the over-water impacts of the project 
will include a trestle, wharf, three ship berths, and new 
vessel approach lane covering 122 acres and handling 
487 total annual vessel calls, one vessel arrival or 
departure every 18 hours. This does not include the 
incidental vessel traffic needed to operate a deep water 
export facility of this magnitude. Therefore, at 
minimum, 122 acres of the Lummi’s U&A fishing 
grounds will be impacted by the proposed project by 
eliminating the Lummi’s access to their U&A fishing 
grounds.72 
The Corps considered avoidance and minimization measures as 
factors in whether the impacts are greater than de minimis, 
but concluded that “this proposed regulation on the time and 
manner of fishing at the U&A fishing ground is an impairment 
or limitation [of treaty rights] that is only appropriate by an 
act of Congress or for the conservation of the fishery 
resource.”73 Accordingly the Corps may not issue the permit 
                                               
71. Lummi Indian Nation v. Cunningham, No. C92-1023 (W.D. Wash. 1992). See, 
e.g., United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 654 (9th Cir. 1998) (Upholding 
District Judge Rafeedie’s ruling that tribal access across private land might be limited 
in some circumstances. The “district court did not err by requiring the Tribes to prove 
the unavailability of other forms of access before allowing them to cross private land.” 
The “district court also [properly] invoked equitable principles to subject the Tribes’ 
Treaty shellfishing right to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions when the 
right is exercised on the Growers’ or Owners’ property.”). 
72. Memorandum for Record: Gateway Pacific Terminal Project and Lummi Nation’s 
Usual and Accustomed Treaty Fishing Rights at Cherry Point, Whatcom County, at 
28, Pacific International Holdings, LLC, NWS-2008-260 (U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs., 
May 9, 2016).  
73. Id. at 31. 
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unless Congress were to authorize impairment of the Lummi 
Nation’s treaty rights – an action not likely to occur and one 
that would raise Fifth Amendment takings issues.74 
The habitat question was taken one logical step further in 
litigation involving culverts that inhibited the ability of adult 
salmon to return to their natal streams to spawn as adults, 
and/or for smolts (juvenile salmon) to migrate to the ocean. In 
the latest chapter of United States v. Washington,75 the Ninth 
Ciruit court of appeals considered an action brought by treaty 
tribes of western Washington in 2001, and joined in by the 
United States as trustee. The court applied fundamental 
techniques of treaty interpretation to reject the State of 
Washington’s claim that the treaties contained no implied 
protection for fisheries habitat.  
In its brief, Washington characterizes the “treaties' 
principal purpose” as ‘opening up the region to 
settlement.’ Brief at 29. Opening up the Northwest for 
white settlement was indeed the principal purpose of 
the United States. But it was most certainly not the 
principal purpose of the Indians. Their principal 
purpose was to secure a means of supporting 
themselves once the Treaties took effect. Salmon were a 
central concern. An adequate supply of salmon was “not 
much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than 
the atmosphere they breathed.’ Winans, 198 U.S. at 
381.”76 
The court concluded that “The Indians did not understand . . . 
that they would have access to their usual and accustomed 
fishing places, but with a qualification that would allow the 
government to diminish or destroy the fish runs. Governor 
Stevens did not make . . . such a cynical and disingenuous 
promise.77 The court accordmng upheld the district court’s 
injunction mandating that the State of Washington repair 
salmon-bolcking culverts over a seventeen year period.78 
                                               
74. See United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (abrogation of treaty 
rights required payment of compensation for property taken). 
75. United States v. Washington, No. 13-35474, 2016 WL 3517884 (9th Cir. June 27, 
2016). 
76. Id. at *10. 
77. Id.  
78. Id. at *23. 
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The “culvert litigation” is an excellent example of how the 
federal-tribal relationship can work to protect treaty rights and 
associated habitat from undue degradation by a third party—
the State of Washington. In the case of climate change and 
ocean acidification, however, the problem is not readily 
targeted by discreet litigation because the primary cause is 
emission of carbon dioxide.79 The problem is pervasive and 
world-wide in nature. Still the federal government should take 
action to minimize emissions and thus avoid even more harm 
to treaty resources and habitat. 
IV. LINKING THE TRUST RESPONSIBILITY, INDIAN 
TREATY RIGHTS, AND THE PROBLEM OF OCEAN 
ACIDIFICATION. 
This section summarizes the rules set out above and argues 
that in light of the potential devastation caused by climate 
change and ocean acidification, the federal government must 
do more than just follow those rules and policies. To be sure 
the United States, as it acts through its various agencies, must 
consider the effects of administrative actions on Indian treaty 
rights, and the habitat that treaty resources rely upon. And 
federal law does not permit adverse impacts on treaty rights 
absent express congressional authorization. Moreover, every 
federal agency must consider any activity it might permit in 
light of the overall effect of any proposed project. Agency 
actions affecting tribal interests must take place in 
consultation with the affected tribes, and be consistent with 
the federal government’s trust responsibility.80 The Army 
Corps of Engineers followed these rules well in its recent 
decision to reject the application for a coal terminal in 
Washington State.81 On the other hand, the important issue of 
whether the coal industry should continue to be encouraged as 
a matter of policy was not addressed in the decision because 
the narrow question before the Corps was the likelihood of 
                                               
79. Robin Kundis Craig, supra note 5, at 1654. 
80. Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 § 3(a) (Nov. 6, 2000) (“Agencies shall 
respect Indian tribal self-government and sovereignty, honor tribal treaty and other 
rights, and strive to meet the responsibilities that arise from the unique legal 
relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribal governments.”). 
81. See discussion supra notes 70–72. 
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unlawful physical interference with Indian treaty rights.82 
However, the effect of the decision is to deprive, or at least 
hinder the export of coal that would lead to increased 
greenhouse gas emissions.83 One commentator noted that 
“more is at stake [than treaty rights], namely the rising costs 
of climate change and the need to keep as much carbon in the 
ground as possible. Coal is one of the worst contributors to 
greenhouse gases and the notion of ‘clean coal’ is, at least for 
now, another example of techno-narcissism.”84 
The Obama Administration did establish a pause in further 
federal coal leasing in January 2016 pending further review. 
Secretary Jewell’s Order highlighted climate impacts. 
  Concerns about Climate Change. The second broad 
category of concerns about the Federal coal program 
relates to its impacts on climate change. The United 
States has pledged to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to reduce its 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 26-28 percent 
below 2005 levels by 2025. The Obama Administration 
has made, and is continuing to make, unprecedented 
efforts to reduce GHG emissions in line with this target 
through numerous measures. Numerous scientific 
studies indicate that reducing GHG emissions from coal 
use worldwide is critical to addressing climate change. 
  At the same time, as noted above, the Federal coal 
program is a significant component of overall United 
States’ coal production. Federal coal represents 
approximately 41 percent of the coal produced in the 
United States, and when combusted, it contributes 
roughly 10 percent of the total U.S. GHG emissions. 
  Many stakeholders highlighted the tension between 
producing very large quantities of Federal coal while 
pursuing policies to reduce U.S. GHG emissions 
substantially, including from coal combustion.85 
                                               
82. Id. 
83. See Lynda V. Mapes, Tribes prevail, kill proposed coal terminal at Cherry Point, 
THE SEATTLE TIMES, http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/tribes-
prevail-kill-proposed-coal-terminal-at-cherry-point (last visited May 11, 2016). 
84. John Talton, Coal’s moment of truth at Cherry Point, THE SEATTLE TIMES, http://
www.seattletimes.com/business/economy/coals-moment-of-truth-at-cherry-point/ (last 
visited May 11, 2016). 
85. Order, 3338 at 4 (Dept. of the Interior, January 15, 2016) (Order by the Secretary 
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As all of the articles in this book note, there are very few 
effective technical or legal tools for controlling ocean 
acidification. There must be dramatic declines in greenhouse 
gas emissions simply to slow the process down. The Secretarial 
Order is a step in the right direction. 
The burden of ocean acidification will fall heavily on Indian 
tribes with treaty rights to marine and freshwater resources. 
As Quinault Tribal Chairperson Fawn Sharp stated, “We’ve 
witnessed the desecration of our ocean being polluted by 
greenhouse gases through acidification, causing the food chain 
for salmon and other sacred natural resources to dwindle.86 
The federal government’s general trust responsibility to Indian 
tribes, coupled with its power and obligation to protect treaty 
resources, can result in incidental actions that may slow 
greenhouse gas emissions like the permit denial at Cherry 
Point. These same authorities support a larger “Indian trust” 
effort to reduce the causes of ocean acidification, just as 
Professor Wood argues in her article.87 At bottom, however, I 
am skeptical that courts will play an effective role in enforcing 
the obligation that the federal government has to protect 
treaty resources by limiting emissions. This is a world-wide 
problem that can only be curbed by a shift from fossil fuels to 
alternatives. The broader trust environmental trust litigation 
advanced by Professor Wood can directly aid the tribal trust 
theories, but it is hard to see litigation leading directly to 
success in the effort-because it can be in a suit to prevent 
damage caused to fisheries by poorly constructed or 
maintained culverts. Instead, enlightened policy makers 
should rely on Indian trust principles and treaty rights to 
buttress arguments favoring policies such as the federal 
moratorium on coal leasing. As noted above, Presidential 
Executive Orders already require agencies to take protective 
actions regarding Indian treaty rights, and to consult with 
Indian tribes when tribal interests may be affected.88 It would 
be a small step to include tribal rights to functioning marine 
and freshwater environments as factors that help guide the 
                                               
of the Interior re. Discretionary Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement to 
Modernize the Federal Coal Program). 
86. Sharp, supra note 4. 
87. See supra note 6. 
88. See supra note 80. 
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United States to greatly reduce its greenhouse gas emissions 
and lead the world in that effort as well. 
Efforts to curb ocean acidification will take a concerted effort 
using all the tools described in the various chapters of this 
book. The special obligations owed by the United States to 
Indigenous Nations that are now part of the national fabric 
should compel strong domestic federal action and international 
leadership to fight the environmental harm caused by carbon 
emissions and ocean acidification. 
